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That is, if the proportionality gap is positive, then women comprise a greater share of undergraduates than of athletes, and the institution is said to be discriminating against female athletes. We adopt a common interpretation of the substantial proportionality standard (see e.g., Robert C. We focus only on positive proportionality gaps as a measure of noncompliance because most institutions that are out of compliance are found to be discriminating against women (rather than against men). in the number of female athletes, net change in the number of male teams, and net change in the number of female teams. Because the focus of this paper is how pressures from Title IX impacted institutions' decisions to add and/or cut teams or athletes for men and women, our key explanatory variable is the 1995-1996 level of the proportionality gap. We use a quadratic in this variable to allow the effect of Title IX pressures to vary by degree of noncompliance.
Other explanatory variables reflect preferences of institutions and their students, institutions' financial ability to provide athletic opportunities for male and female students, and structural constraints. Preferences are represented by public/private control, region (South, Midwest, West, Northeast), an indicator for historically black college or university, and selectivity (four levels of Barron's rankings). Financial wealth is measured by endowment assets per student, tuition and fee level, state appropriations per student (equal to zero for private institutions), and giving dollars per student. Finally, structural constraints include undergraduate enrollment (which represents the size of the pool of potential athletes) and athletic division (which imposes requirements for team offerings, roster size, and scholarships). For more details on the choice of explanatory variables, please see Cheslock and Anderson (2003) . Table 2 reports the regression coefficients of the proportionality gap and its square for models run separately by gender and for changes in teams (columns 1 and 2) and participants (columns 3 and 4).4 In both models, point estimates suggest that institutions that are further out of compliance, as measured by a large proportionality gap, are more likely to increase female athletics and decrease male athletics, all else equal. Further, the quadratic term indicates that the marginal effect for women diminishes as the proportionality gap increases, whereas it rises for men. These results are stronger for women than for men. First, considering changes in teams, the only statistically significant results are for women. Second, although results for participants are statistically significant for both genders, the positive effect for women is much larger in absolute value than the negative effect for men. For example, the marginal effect at a 5-percentage-point proportionality gap suggests an addition of 2.4 female athletes and a reduction of 1.2 male athletes. This gender difference grows with the level of noncompliance: the marginal effect at a 13-percentage-point proportionality gap is more than three times as large for female athletes (+1.8) as for male athletes (-0.5). Results are qualitatively similar when regressions are estimated separately by division (data available from the authors upon request).
IV. Conclusion
Overall, our results reveal that institutions were more likely to add female teams or participants than to cut male teams or participants in order to move closer to compliance between 1995-1996 and 2001-2002. The descriptive statistics show a slight increase in teams and athletes for men and a much larger increase in both for women. The regression results indicate a dual response to a large proportionality gap, controlling for other factors: a combination of adding female teams/athletes and dropping male teams/athletes, with a greater reliance on the former.
We believe that some losses for men's sports are an expected or intended consequence of Title IX. That is, in an era of rising highereducation costs and unstable revenue sources, it is unrealistic to expect institutions to make all adjustments toward greater gender equity by adding female athletes; the cost of such leveling up would be prohibitive. However, some losses for male athletes may be unintended. For example, it is possible that an institution is willing and financially able to grow the size of its athletic program by adding slots for female athletes but finds it impossible to fill these slots due to lack of interest among current undergraduate women. If this institution feels bound to reach compliance via substantial proportionality and does not feel comfortable relying on the third prong (i.e., effectively accommodating the interests of female athletes), this institution might be forced to cut men's slots to reach a gender balance in athletes.
Future work will attempt to disaggregate these intended and unintended consequences by jointly examining changes in men's and women's teams or participants using multinomial logistic regression. In addition, we will examine the other commonly invoked explanation for the elimination of certain men's sports like wrestling: the "arms race" in expenditures on highprofile men's sports like football and basketball .
